As Nigeria prepares to hold elections early next year, the political contest has become increasingly heated, with both the country’s foremost political parties experiencing a public backlash over their choice of candidates. At the same time, escalating attacks by Islamist militants and bandits, inter-communal ethnic and religious violence, and the activity of separatist rebels all threaten to undermine the credibility of the election.

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On 25 February 2023, Nigeria will hold general elections at the federal level against a backdrop of growing militancy, inter-communal conflict, and rising socio-economic risks. Despite the signing of a peace accord by the 18 political parties contesting the election, since the start of the campaigning period in October, at least four people have been killed in over 50 violent election-related incidents recorded across the country. Notably, on 9 November at least one person was killed and 74 people wounded when a large group of people attacked the convoy of the opposition Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) presidential candidate, former vice president Atiku Abubakar, in Maiduguri, Borno state.

There is a high likelihood that such incidents will lead to reciprocal cycles of violence between rival party supporters over the coming weeks and months. At the same time, leading political candidates have increasingly adopted divisive language, threatening to exacerbate ongoing episodes of ethnic and religious inter-communal violence in many areas of the country. Bandits, secessionist rebels, and Islamist militant groups, are also likely to escalate attacks to disrupt the election, including on Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) offices, employees, and voting sites.

PANGEA-RISK assesses the political and security outlook ahead of the election.

Intra-party divisions threaten to undermine political campaigns

FORMER VICE PRESIDENT ATIKU ABUBAKAR

The election is shaping up to be a close contest. Despite the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC) having secured victory in the last two elections, the results of opinion polls conducted in September by Bloomberg and the ANAP Foundation favour Labour Party (LP) presidential candidate, Peter Obi, by a notable margin to the APC’s Bola Tinubu and the PDP’s Abubakar. While Obi has no doubt become increasingly popular since his defection from the PDP in May, the LP has performed relatively poorly in the last two presidential and legislative elections. Nonetheless, while the accuracy of polls conducted four months out from the vote should be viewed with scepticism, this outcome matches with a broad sense that voters have become deeply frustrated with the country’s two major political parties (see NIGERIA: TWO-PARTY POLITICAL GODFATHERS SEEK PRESIDENTIAL POWER AT 2023 ELECTIONS).

In particular, the PDP has suffered a loss of support deriving from internal fractures, revolving in large part over the party’s choice of presidential candidate. Abubakar was born in Adawama state, northern Nigeria, and many within the PDP have argued that the party ought to have chosen a representative from the south for this election, in line with a long-standing party custom to rotate the leadership. Furthermore, the appointment of Iyorchia Ayu as PDP National Chairman has provoked similar frustrations, given that Ayu and Abubakar are both from the north.

LABOUR PARTY PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE PETER OBI

This situation appears to have alienated the party’s southern branches, and to some extent explains Obi’s growing popularity, which has been most pronounced in Nigeria’s southern states. In late November, the PDP governors of Abia, Benue, Enugu, Oyo, and Rivers states in southern Nigeria announced the formation of a new internal coalition, named the Integrity Group (also known as the G-5). The new faction is headed by Rivers state governor Nyesom Wike, who narrowly lost to Abubakar in the PDP presidential primary earlier in the year (see NIGERIA: RUNNING MATE SELECTIONS UPSET 2023 CAMPAIGNS AS INFLATION CONTINUES TO RISE). Wike has since indicated that he intends to support presidential candidates from other parties, pledging “logistical support” for Obi, as well as for Rabiu Kwankwaso of the New Nigeria Peoples’ Party (NNPP).

FORMER LAGOS GOVERNOR BOLA TINUBU

At the same time, while the APC won the last two elections, popular support for the party has fallen significantly since 2019 due to deteriorating security conditions across the country, as well as growing socio-economic grievances. Moreover, President Muhammadu Buhari will not run for another term, raising doubts over the APC’s next candidate can match his popular appeal. The nomination of Bola Tinubu and Kashim Shettima as president and vice-president, respectively, has also generated significant controversy across Nigeria due to both leaders being Muslim. Many both within and outside of the APC view this as a violation of the convention that the country’s two most senior leaders should each represent one of Nigeria’s two major religions: Islam and Christianity. This has already damaged the party’s prospects, as Christian community leaders in the north have called for a boycott of the APC over the “Muslim-Muslim” ticket.

Risk of inter-communal and political violence

NIGERIAN SOLDIERS ON THE STREETS OF ABUJA

For the first time, the three leading presidential candidates will each come from a different major ethnic group: Igbo, Yoruba, and Hausa/Fulani. As such, with both the PDP and APC aware of their vulnerable positions, the election period has seen a resurgence of divisive rhetoric, as leading candidates have attempted to mobilise supporters along ethnic lines. This in turn has driven hostile responses from “rival” ethnic groups, who have interpreted such efforts as a potential threat. For instance, shortly after PDP leader Abubakar publicly highlighted his Fulani ethnicity, in early November the PDP governor of Benue state, Samuel Ortom, accused the presidential candidate of supporting Fulani ethnic militias in his state. Deadly armed confrontations between Fulani herders and farmers over access to grazing land and water in Benue state have become increasingly frequent in recent years, driving ethnic tensions.

The APC’s choice of two candidates of the same faith also adds to the threat that the election will become defined as a contest based chiefly on religious identity. Indeed, many Christian communities have expressed fears that an exclusively Muslim leadership will encourage the persecution of Christians. At least seven attacks on churches have been recorded this year in Nigeria, including an attack on 5 June on a church in Owo, Ondo state, in which over 40 people were killed (see NIGERIA: GOVERNMENT FACES DIVERSE AND SERIOUS INSECURITY AHEAD OF 2023 ELECTIONS). Given this, there is particular concern that the run-up to the election will be marked by increased violence between Christian and Muslim communities.

Security threats predominate

While episodes of inter-communal violence are an evident concern, the main threat to the elections derives from the activity of non-state armed groups. In the north-east of the country, Islamist militant groups, including Boko Haram, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), and Jamāʿatu Anṣāril Muslimīna fī Bilādis Sūdān (known as Ansaru), have overtly expressed their opposition to democracy. During previous electoral cycles, these groups have significantly escalated attacks in order to disrupt election proceedings, including by targeting election workers and voting stations. In particular, Boko Haram and ISWAP are likely to intensify attacks on security forces and government targets in order to isolate rural communities, as well as to discourage broader turnout by undermining faith in the authorities’ ability to secure the election process.

Similarly, bandit groups in the north-central and north-western states have threatened to kidnap political candidates in order to extract ransoms. Bandits are also likely to interfere with the movement of INEC personnel and election materials along critical routes, such as the Abuja-Kaduna highway, which is regularly subjected to bandit attacks. On 5 December, the rail service between Abuja and Kaduna resumed under heavy security following a militant/bandit attack on the railway line eights months previously (see NIGERIA: MAJOR ATTACKS IN KADUNA STATE SIGNAL ESCALATION OF SECURITY CRISIS). While these groups have not overtly expressed their opposition to the election, given growing evidence of co-operation between bandit groups and Islamist militants, there is a growing likelihood that they will escalate attacks during the election period in line with the Islamists’ anti-democratic objectives (see NIGERIA: THREAT OF SOPHISTICATED TERROR ATTACKS RISES AHEAD OF 2023 ELECTIONS).

In south-eastern Nigeria, the secessionist Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), and its armed wing, the Eastern Security Network (ESN), have signalled their readiness to interfere with the elections to obtain political leverage. IPOB/ESN has previously threatened to disrupt past election cycles by enforcing a “stay-at-home” order in Nigeria’s south-eastern states in order to secure prisoner releases. The group has also directly threatened INEC officials, election candidates, and voters, indicating a willingness to use violence to prevent elections from proceeding.

Political violence is also driven by the activity of criminal groups, who are contracted by local politicians to disrupt election proceedings in their opponents’ strongholds, or even to attack rival political leaders. Such incidents have escalated since the start of November. For instance, the attack on Abubakar on 9 November appears to fit this pattern. Moreover, on 10 November, an INEC office in Abeokuta South, Ogun state, was set alight by an unidentified group of people, resulting in the destruction of 70,000 biometric voter IDs as well as an array of other election materials. A similar attack was reported on the same day on an INEC office in Oke-Iresi, Osun state.

An escalation of violence in the coming months will likely compromise the credibility of the election result. Significant numbers of people are likely to be dissuaded from turning out to vote due to mounting insecurity, particularly in the north, which typically has a higher turnout than the southern provinces. Moreover, escalating violence has generated millions of internally displaced people (IDPs), a significant portion of whom will be unable to vote. As such, the election result is increasingly likely to be challenged in the wake of the vote, heightening the prospects for post-election violence. Similarly, any delays to the election as a result of security challenges is likely to drive cycles of political violence, with supporters of rival political leaders likely to perceive any postponement as a signal of political interference.