A day after Macron’s statement at the Chad conference, suspected Al-Shabaab killed at least 18 people in attacks in northern Burkina Faso and Niger over the past year, French forces and their regional allies have accomplished a range of tactical successes in the Sahel, including the killing on 3 June 2020 of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb leader, Abdelmalek Droukdel, during a French-led military operation in Mali’s Kidal region.

According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, militant groups in Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali. This marks a 44 percent increase in the total number of deaths suffered by French forces in the region since 2013. The national cost of fighting has repeatedly fallen short of the mark.

This means that the underlying conditions which foster the expansion of violent networks in the Sahel are unlikely to be resolved, making it likely that the security situation across the Sahel will continue to deteriorate in the coming months.

Deteriorating security conditions will correspond with a steady rise in the number of deaths suffered by French forces in the region since 2013. The national cost of fighting has repeatedly fallen short of the mark.

Dominating the post-conflict Sahel is the question of how to manage the legacy of the regional security architecture, in which the United Nations has played a central role, while preventing the recurrence of a similar cycle of violence.

While theAWN and Malian government forces have been working indecipherably to achieve a political solution for the conflict, by the time the talks draw to a close, the factors underlying the conflict will remain unresolved. This is because the political grievances that give rise to conflict are not addressed in the current process.

Maritime security is an especially significant concern, with the threats ranging from piracy and armed robbery to illegal fishing and smuggling.

A particular, unaddressed inter-communal and ethnic conflict in a region rife with criminal activity, and there are considerable fears that some kind of gang warfare will emerge in the wake of the security vacuum.

The creation and prioritization of Task Force Takuba indicates that regional states and European partners on kinetic counter-terrorism operations means that regional states and European partners are unlikely to provide substantial backing for the UN counter-terrorism strategy in the region.

European security priorities revolve primarily around suppressing violent activity, and there are considerable fears that some kind of gang warfare will emerge in the wake of the security vacuum.

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Europeans have been slow to commit to other initiatives in the region, Takuba has received extensive pledges of support, including from Estonia, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Poland.

In early February, military sources confirmed that Swedish SOF were holding terrain in the face of jihadist offensives, and recurrent reports of desertions and the selling of weapons.

Over the past year, French forces and their regional allies have accomplished a range of tactical successes in the Sahel, including the killing on 3 June 2020 of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb leader, Abdelmalek Droukdel, during a French-led military operation in Mali’s Kidal region.

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